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After uprooting Saddam Hussein from power, establishing democracy in
Iraq has been declared among the most important objectives of the U.S.-
led Coalition. However, the Coalition has encountered complex ethnic
and religious relations and resentment of foreign intervention in Iraq.
These reactions reflect decades, even centuries, of divisive and antag-
onistic policies whose impacts continue to complicate and threaten co-
existence and civil peace. The immediate challenge of achieving stability
and peace in Iraq, therefore, rests in the ability to foster a genuinely
indigenous institutional political structure that can accommodate the
different ethnic and sectarian aspirations. This article highlights the
major potential shortcomings of the federal model established by
the ‘‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional
Period.’’ It also examines the shortcomings of the List Proportional
Representation system as presented by the United Nations for Iraq’s
transition, and alternatively proposes national electoral reform strate-
gies, with the implementation of an Alternative Vote system with Mi-
nority Provision in the election to the National Assembly, as a means to
strengthen Iraq’s national unity.
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Democracy in Iraq
After uprooting Saddam Hussein from power, establishing democracy in Iraq has
been proclaimed among the most important objectives of the U.S.-led Coalition.
President George W. Bush announced that, ‘‘the transition from dictatorship to
democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until
our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.’’1 This
1President George W. Bush, May 2, 2003: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraqcharts.htm.
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mission, however, has run into tremendous obstacles, including persistent insur-
gencies, evidently exceeding any anticipated military and economic challenges.
Decades of ethno-religious repression along with a history of colonial occupation
have taken a toll on relationships among the country’s social groups. Deep-rooted
divisions and antagonizing political processes now have been set in motion, pitting
various factions of the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish communities against each other or
against the foreign forces in the country. Former U.S. Administrator for the Co-
alition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, has described the situation as follows:
The scars in this country run very deep. The thugs and the torture chambers may
be gone, but every day we find new evidence of how bad the regime was that we
threw out. And repairing the damage of the last regime, material, human and
psychological, is a huge task, and it’s a task that is only going to succeed if we have
a real partnership with the Iraqi people.2
The ambiguity of U.S. position on Iraqi democracy, however, has complicated the
task of winning Iraqis’ confidence. Fearing dominance by the majority Shiite
groups, the U.S. was initially hesitant to authorize quick elections, preferring
some form of representational coalition system (even at first considering a caucus
system) at least in transition. For many months American efforts centered on some
version of the appointed Iraqi Governing Council (GC), including its significant
contingent of returned expatriate Iraqis. As this council’s legitimacy was questioned
and as Washington was forced to look increasingly to the United Nations for advice
and legitimization, the possibility of some transitional authority of Iraqi notables
emerged as the U.S.-imposed deadline of June 30, 2004 for Iraqi ‘‘sovereignty’’
approached. Since that time, uneven and heavy-handed American security meas-
ures in the midst of increasingly effective and deadly attacks by insurgents and
opposition groups have drawn criticism from civil and human rights groups and
have further undermined the U.S.-claimed democratic mission in Iraq.
Thus, the ‘‘success’’ of the U.S.-led intervention remains dependent upon Wash-
ington’s ability to help institutionalize a consensual political regime capable of
bridging the ethnic-sectarian divides and capable of negating a neo-colonial image.
This is a difficult process indeed, in one of the world’s most traditionally anti-
colonial areas (note the fate of the British installed Iraqi monarchy in 1958). Failure
would certainly deal a blow to the U.S.-led regional effort, including the similar
transition process going on slowly in Afghanistan, and leading to internal Iraqi
ethnic-religious strife and perhaps disintegration and civil war; such instability
could provide compelling reasons for several regional states to intervene directly or
indirectly and could spread the threat of terrorism more widely.3 The stakes are
high and the question of what is the most effective and appropriate democratic
political structure in Iraq awaits urgent answers.
The November 15 Agreement and the Transfer of Power
The initial effort to restore political sovereignty to Iraqis began on November
15, 2003 after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi GC reached
an agreement for the transfer of power and the establishment of a Transitional
Iraqi Government (TG) by June 2004.4 Inherent in much of the planning
2U.S. Administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, June 12, 2003: http://usinfo.
state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraqcharts.htm.
3Political instability in Iraq may undermine the national security of most bordering states particularly because
Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian population stretches in its geopolitical significance throughout the region.
4See Coalition Provisional Authority official documents and Web site: http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/
AgreementNov15.pdf. The GC had 13 Shiite Arab members, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkmen, and one
Christian.
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have been notions of federalism, given the ethnic and regional diversity of the
country.5
In light of controversy over the question of direct elections and the potential
emergence of a state dominated by the largest ethnic community, presumably the
Shi’a, the election of members to the Transitional National Assembly was to be
conducted through a transparent, participatory, democratic process of caucuses in
each of Iraq’s 18 governorates under direct supervision by the CPA.
A permanent Iraqi constitution is to be prepared by a constitutional convention
directly elected by the Iraqi people. Elections for the convention were set for no
later than March 15, 2005. A draft of the constitution will be circulated for public
comment and debate, and the final draft will be presented to the public in a ref-
erendum. Elections for a new Iraqi government would then be held by December
31, 2005, at which point the Fundamental Law would expire and a new govern-
ment would take power. The ‘‘November 15 Agreement’’ and its timetable were
soon challenged for various reasons by Iraq’s Shi’a majority, by members of the GC,
and of course, by implication, in the armed insurgency prevalent in the so-called
Sunni triangle. The powerful Iraqi religious authority Grand Ayatollah Sistani re-
jected the formation of unelected Transitional National Assembly.6 His opposition
was followed by massive street demonstrations throughout Iraq for several days in
direct challenge to the GC and the CPA. The growing opposition by the majority
Shi’a population and its religious authorities forced the U.S. administration to
consider revising the transitional plans. This came after the GC also split on the
question of whether its 13 Shi’a members were leaning toward supporting Sistani’s
demands.7 Finally, the GC and CPA’s representatives arrived in New York to break
the impasse and to seek an active role for the United Nations in assessing the
possibility of early elections. The representatives asked the U.N. to help in this
regard.
This early stalemate on Iraqi elections reflects the deep suspicion among Iraqi
ethnic groups in building a new political system. Shi’a GC members supporting
early elections were confronted with Kurdish, Sunni, and Christian opposition,
indicating the potentially antagonistic political aspirations of various ethno-sectar-
ian communities. In this, the situation somewhat resembled the Balkans, but with a
more limited scope of civil violence; indeed, in some respects, there was less overt
inter-communal conflict during the initial years of occupation than some might
have anticipated, as opposition instead was addressed largely to the occupation
authorities themselves.8
‘‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period’’
On March 8, 2004 the GC and CPA were able to ratify ‘‘fundamental laws’’ known
as ‘‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period.’’ As
established in the November 15 agreement, the document outlines the basic con-
stitutional tenets of the future Iraqi government as well as a timetable for the
transfer of authority to it. But the document fell far short of gaining the consensus
of Iraqis, and instead it became an issue for exploiting the ethno-religious divide.
Opposition to the administrative laws emerged from among the GC where var-
ious Shi’a members expressed reservation. Most Shi’a and Sunni groups and
5According to the CIA World Fact Book, Iraq’s population is distributed to 65% Shi’a, 20% Sunni Kurds, 12%
Sunnis Arabs, 3% Turkeman, and others.
6Ayatollah Sistani is a main religious authority emulated by millions of Shi’as around the world. He declared his
opposition to the November 15 Agreement on January 16, 2004. See BBC Monitoring International Reports, January
16, 2004
7The International Herald Tribune, January 26, 2004, p. 5.
8It must be noted that underlying the inter-ethnic divide are both issues of insecurity (e.g., prior poison gas
warfare) and competition for wealth and resources, especially in territorial control of petroleum deposits.
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religious figures received the document with either reservation or total rejection.
The Shi’a concerns focused primarily on three issues: the Islamic identity of the
state; Kurdish power and potential vetoes; and the legal foundation of transitional
laws drafted under foreign occupation and supervision. Most Shi’a religious au-
thorities, such as Ayatollah Anajafy and Ayatollah Al-Moudarissy, in addition to GC
member Al-Sayyed Hakim, particularly objected to Article 61 (C), which posits that
‘‘the general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a
majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or
more governorates do not reject it.’’9 This article was perceived to lay the foun-
dation of a divisive federalism that provides the Kurdish minority with what is
viewed as disproportionate power relative to the Shi’a majority. In other words, it
afforded the three Kurdish provinces (Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah) the ability to
obstruct any constitutional ratification. Article 53 (a) further recognizes a form of
Kurdish self-rule, and thus establishes potential dual sovereignties in Iraq:
The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government
of the territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in
the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The
term ‘‘Kurdistan Regional Government’’ shall refer to the Kurdistan National
Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of Ministers, and the regional judicial authority
in the Kurdistan region.
The transitional laws were seen to further prepare the ground for national frag-
mentation by allowing any three administrative governorates in Iraq to establish a
federal ‘‘region.’’ Article 53 (c) declares that, ‘‘Any group of no more than three
governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and
Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves.’’ This can be
established after an elected national assembly and a regional referendum. This
implied that, in addition to a Kurdistan region in the north, Shi’a concentrated
governorates in the south (e.g., Basrah, Missan, Thi-Qar, Najaf, Karbala, Wassit,
Mthanna) could establish two regions while the Sunni in the Center and East might
also establish a separate region (see Table 1).
In addition to the transitional laws’ implications for the unity of Iraq, Article 7 of
the administrative laws provided another source of tension and uncertainty in
stating that:
Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of
legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the
principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be’
enacted during the transitional period. This Law respects the Islamic identity of
the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all
individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice.
This article represented a major concern both for the Islamic religious authorities,
since it established Islam as ‘‘a’’ source rather than ‘‘the’’ source of legislation, and
for the traditionally secular Iraqi power structure and non-Islamic minorities. Shi’a
religious authorities have sensed a potential clash between its teachings and that of
‘‘other’’ secular and ‘‘western’’-oriented sources of legislation being enacted in fu-
ture laws.
The more conservative Shi’a and Sunni religious elements, along with former
Ba’athist elements, also have challenged the laws’ authenticity. Sayed Al-Sadr and
various Arab Sunni figures rejected the laws outright as having been imposed by
the occupying authority rather than formulated by the Iraqi people and their
9‘‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’’ (March 8, 2004). http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/TAL.html.
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legitimate representatives. These tensions and opposition were manifested in dem-
onstrations and violent clashes with CPA forces throughout Iraq, and in effective
and persistent armed insurrections among the Sunnis (supposedly including
former armed forces and tribal clans, although no official insurgent group has been
identified) and among Shi’a supporters of Al-Sadr, wanted for arrest in prior in-
cidents of political violence. Although previously little known and minutely sup-
ported, Al-Sadr came to notoriety if not prominence with the emergence of his
militia, hence setting an unfortunate example for other would-be leaders.
While an in-depth examination of Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian geo-demographic
division can help explain these sentiments and reveal the shortcomings and po-
tentially explosive consequences of the proposed U.S. and even U.N. political plans,
the nature of political solutions applicable in so-called ‘‘divided societies’’ can be
revealing. Thus, we examine the scholarly research regarding alternative political
arrangements for states such as Iraq, in light of its ethno-sectarian divisions, social
structure and resource distribution, and international environment.
What Political System?
The question of the best political arrangement for Iraq to satisfy its multi ethnic-
religious constituents is as old as modern Iraq itself, and can be seen especially
reflected in the rise of the Kurdish ‘‘national question.’’10 Since Iraq’s independ-
ence, Iraqi Kurds have continued to demand various forms of separate national
status, in relation to their brethren in neighboring states. Some Kurdish move-
ments, reflecting clan as well as political aspirations, have fought for the total
TABLE 1. Population and Ethnic Group Concentration by Iraqi Governorates
Governorate Total Population Major Group Major/Minor 1 Major/Minor 2
Anbar 1,023,736 Sunni Arabs Shi’a Arabs
Basrah 1,556,445 Shi’a Arabs Sunni Arabs
Muthanna 436,825 Shi’a Arabs
Qadissiya 751,331 Shi’a Arabs
Najaf 775,042 Shi’a Arabs
Erbil 1,095,992 Sunni Kurds Sunni Arabs Sunni Turkomans
Sulaymaniyah 1,362,739 Sunni Kurds Sunni Arabs Sunni Turkomans
Tameem 753,171 Sunni Arabs Sunni Kurds Sunni Turkomans
Babil 1,181,751 Sunni Arabs Shi’a Arabs
Baghdad 5,423,964 Shi’a Arabs Sunni Arabs Sunni Kurds
Dahuk 402,970 Sunni Kurds Sunni Arabs
Thi-Qar 1,184,796 Shi’a Arabs
Diyala 1,135,223 Sunni Arabs Shi’a Arabs Sunni Kurds
Karbala 594,235 Shi’a Arabs
Missan 637,126 Shi’a Arabs
Ninewa 2,042,852 Sunni Arabs Sunni Kurds
Salah al-Din 904,432 Sunni Arabs Shi’a Arabs
Wassit 783,614 Shi’a Arabs Sunni Arabs
Total 22,046,244
Sources: Population based on 1997 census, provided by UNOHCI. Ethnic group distribution is a rough estimation
mapped by UNOSAT and ‘‘Iraq: Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Major Tribes From Iraq’’ Country
Profile [map], CIA, January 2003. Not including other minor ethnic and sectarian groups.
10See Iliya F. Harik’s work The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1972) which provides important backgrounds about the inspiration of major ethnic groups in the
Middle East including the Kurds.
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national independence of Kurdistan while others have demanded various forms of
autonomy.11 Some have made temporary arrangements with authorities in Bagh-
dad or Tehran, while others have suffered direct attacks, Turkish harassment, and
the withdrawal of outside assistance. Thus, ethnic drives represent a direct chal-
lenge to the multi-ethnic fabric of the country and the surrounding regional
states.12
The victory of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979 and the beginning radicalization
of the Shiite Islamic movements in the Middle East presented a new challenge to
the ethno-religious fabric of the entire post-World War II Middle Eastern nation-
state system.13 Like Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and some other multi-ethnic states in
the region, Iraq had operated with a regime based primarily in a minority ethnic
community (in this case the Arab Sunni community). Iraqi Shi’a retained their Arab
as opposed to Persian identity, allowing for a distinction from their Iranian neigh-
bors that held during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s. Various analysts also noted
nationalist Sunni-dominated states’ support for Iraq in that war, stemming from
fear of the emerging Iranian sectarian model.14
Following the first Gulf War in 1991, and the nascent deterioration of the Iraqi
regime, with the establishment of no-fly zones for example, both the Kurds in the
north and the Shi’a in the South began to realize greater ethno-religious assertiveness
and separatist momentum, although the U.S. clearly permitted Baghdad to forcefully
reassert control in the South.15 The final collapse of the Ba’ath nationalist Iraqi
regime in the second Gulf War has finally brought Iraq’s ethnicities to the possible
realization of their liberation aspirations, but also has generated an evident ethnic
insecurity dilemma similar to the one being played out in Afghanistan. What ethno-
political system, if any, can maintain the national integrity of Iraq, curb ethnic sep-
aratism, relieve fears, jealousies and tensions, and reassure the neighboring nations?
This question has invited the attention of scholars and analysts who have pre-
sented various plans for a post-Hussein Iraq. Peter W. Galbraith, a former U.S.
Ambassador to Croatia and an expert on Iraqi Kurdistan, suggested that consid-
ering the separate geo-ethnic groups that almost unanimously do not want to be
part of the same country, a loose federation is the only hope for holding Iraq
together.16 Similarly, Alon Ben-Meir proposed the federalization of Iraq into three
constituent states: Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’ite. According to Ben-Meir’s plan, the
three states would be joined in a bicameral parliamentary system providing equal
power to the states in its upper chamber and proportional representation in its
lower body. The lower chamber would operate on the European parliamentary
model, yielding a ‘‘ministerally’’ styled coalition government.17
In his ‘‘Multi-National Federalism, Federacy, Power Sharing and the Kurds of
Iraq,’’ Brendan O’Leary provides a comprehensive analysis of Iraq’s ethno-demo-
graphic momentum and alternative systems of federalism.18 O’Leary, who exam-
11Nouri Talabany, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region (Uppsala: Kurdistan Studies Press, 2001), p. 131.
12See Michael N. Barnett, ‘‘Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System.’’ Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 49(3) (Summer, 1995), pp. 479–510.
13The spread of the Iranian model found its early manifestation in the Lebanese Shi’a Islamist groups’ call for an
Islamic Republic in Lebanon, which alarmed the Lebanese Christian minorities.
14Maridi Nahas, ‘‘State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East.’’ Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17(4), November 1985, pp. 507–527.
15Pierre-Jean Luizard and Joe Stork, ‘‘The Iraqi Question from the Inside.’’ Middle East Report No. 193, The
Iraq Sanctions Dilemma (March–April 1995), pp. 18–22.
16Peter W. Galbraith, ‘‘Kurdistan and a Federal Iraq: How the Kurds Created Facts on the Ground.’’ Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, November 2003,Vol. 1(5).
17Alon Ben-Meir, ‘‘Democratizing Iraq.’’ United Press International, April 27, 2003.
18Brendan O’Leary ‘‘Multi-National Federalism, Federacy, Power Sharing and the Kurds of Iraq.’’ A paper
presented to the conference on ‘Multi-Nationalism, Power Sharing, and the Kurds in a New Iraq.’’ Cafritz Foun-
dation Conference Center, George Washington University, September 12, 2003.
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ined the question of Iraq from a ‘‘Kurdish prism,’’ advocates multi-national fed-
eralism as the best political structure, proposing that Iraq be divided along ethnic
lines. In stressing an ethnic distribution of power, he dismissed federalism as
implemented in the U.S. as being inappropriate for Iraq,19 and foresees an ethno-
democratic federation whose future must remain ‘‘bi-national, multi-ethnic, toler-
antly multi-religious, and multi-regional.’’20
O’Leary thus rejects the notion of ‘‘territorial and constitutional federalism’’
proposed by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha. The Drs. Dawisha considered
ethnic-based federalism ‘‘a mistake,’’ leading potentially to depredations such as
ethnic cleansing. They proposed instead a territorially based federalism that would
preserve Iraq’s present administrative structure of 18 governorates, each main-
taining a mixed ethnic and sectarian population.21 Such a system would purport-
edly defuse ethnic polarization and begin to move beyond identity-based politics.
Advocates of federalism share a common point of departure: that ethnic, re-
gional, and religious ‘‘identity’’ cleavages drive the essence of contemporary politics
in states such as Iraq, and that their future fundamentally depends on management
designed for ethnic pluralism. They propose that the political manifestation of
these cleavages in any future state must be recognized, partially through a terri-
torial federation or fully through an ethno-national federation.
While these propositions have provided valuable insights and potential remedies,
there is as yet no credible method for evaluating which approach is most appro-
priate given various political circumstances. Political experiences derived from the
U.S., Europe, or other states with a history of democratic traditions and higher
levels of economic development can be misleading when applied to divided soci-
eties in the developing world. The citizens of these developing states must them-
selves accept the democratic transition rather than have it imposed from the
outside;22 indeed, it must be remembered that Iraq itself, although less than 100
years old in its present form, reflects a 3000-year-old civilization that has been the
cradle of modern law. Iraq retains elements of the traditional society, some of which
appear to be reasserted in calls for religious law, for example, alongside secular-
ization and modernization attained over the past 50 years. It therefore seems ev-
ident that the governance model for a specific country must take into account
circumstances in the inter-ethnic demographic mix: the history of inter-ethnic ten-
sion and conflict; the extent of ethnic cross-border linkages and interventions; the
degree of economic development and resource distribution; and the existing dem-
ocratic tradition.
The Problems of Federalism in Iraq
Most plans for the new political regime in Iraq, including the ‘‘November 15
agreement’’ and the ‘‘Transitional Administrative Laws,’’ prepare the ground for an
Iraqi federal system divided into two ethnically distinct regions: Kurdish in the
North and Arabic in the South. This system would consist of 18 regional districts,
19Note though that some authors indeed see the U.S. constitution as an ethnically brokered pluralist bargain.
See, e.g., David Hackett Fisher, Albion’s Seed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
20O’Leary, Op. cit, 2003.
21Adeed I. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, ‘‘How to Build a Democratic Iraq.’’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, Vol.
82(3), p. 39.
22Recently, a spate of literature has emerged arguing for the feasibility of imposing democracy and freedom by
force, especially in pressure for ‘‘free and fair elections,’’ as was done in Germany and Japan (see Mark Peceny
‘‘Democracy at the Point of Bayonets.’’ Pennsylvania State University, 1999). Careful evaluation, however (Frederic
Pearson and Scott Walker, ‘‘Should We Really Force Them To Be Free: An Empirical Examination of Peceny’s
Liberalizing Intervention Hypothesis.’’ Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Ann
Arbor, MI, November 2003), has shown these claims to be overdrawn, as the former Axis powers appear to have
been special cases and as other supposedly democratic transitions have had dubious outcomes in the areas of human
rights and judicial integrity.
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and providing any three the ability to form a single region. The plans also allow for
maintaining a separate Kurdish self-government in the Iraqi northern provinces
with the ability to revise federal laws within its jurisdiction.
The proposed transitional laws also provide for a Majlis Watani (National As-
sembly), to be elected no later than January 2005. The National Assembly of the
new republic would be a unicameral legislature with 275 elected members based on
proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies. The assembly will elect the
President, who along with two deputies, will form a ‘‘Presidency Council’’ to ‘‘rep-
resent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country.’’ The
Presidency Council appoints the Prime Minister and cabinet, all of whom must be
approved by the Assembly. Kurdish areas would remain a self-governing region,
formally a parliamentary democratic entity, but de facto divided into two parts each
governed by one of the dominant Kurdish political parties.
Thus a form of ‘‘power sharing’’ has been worked into this federal plan. Power
sharing often is posited as an alternative to federalism, allowing various contending
groups and ethnicities to share power in a centralized state, as for example in
arrangements for a joint or ‘‘revolving’’ presidency or the parceling of govern-
mental offices in quotas to the various contenders. Lebanon has long used this
approach to its diversity challenges, designating the presidency for a Maronite
Christian, the prime minister office for a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the As-
sembly for a Shi’a, the chief judicial justice for a Druze, etc. Obviously, the results do
not always preclude continued conflict, violence, and even civil war, but Lebanon’s
case can also be considered unique in the degree of external intervention it has
traditionally suffered. Still the particular forms and extent of power sharing en-
visioned for Iraq have not been clearly spelled out, and the ability to sustain con-
sensus amid divided or weak governments, local autonomy or separatist
movements, demands for minority rights and veto power, secular-religious legal
contention, uncertain civil-military relations, potential for extreme rejectionists,
and foreign intervention (as potentially by Turkey in the North) remain to be seen.
The major initial danger of such an envisioned federation plan would be the
emergence of a struggle over resources between as well as within the provinces.
Antagonism between oil- and water-rich provinces versus poor regions could be
established. Areas south of the Tigris and Euphrates would continue to demand
greater flow of water from the Northern provinces. Regions with water outlets to
the Arabian–Persian Gulf would presumably have greater leverage on the process
of oil export delivered via the sea or future pipelines from the inland provinces.
Historic and territorial claims would only fuel tensions. For example, the city of
Kirkuk could represent a disputed area between the Kurds and the Arabs. Ter-
ritorial demarcations would therefore potentially represent sources of conflict and
reasons for ongoing power struggle between the provinces. All of this would re-
quire intricate bargaining and brokering among the contending forces, a phenom-
enon not unknown in Iraqi history, but one seldom undertaken before in a Western
democratic context.23
Another concern in a polarized federal system would be an ethno-sectarian
power struggle: Arab–Kurdish, Muslim–Christian, Sunni–Shi’a social cleavages with
parties struggling to obtain greater access to power or to blunt the power advan-
tages of others. Such tensions could emerge either in provinces dominated by
one group or in provinces that lack an ethnic–sectarian ‘‘purity,’’ as in Ninewa,
23Indeed, the very definition of ‘‘democracy’’ in the Middle East is in contention. Islamic scholars have been
quick to argue that there are significant democratic elements within Islam and Islamic law, citing such elements as
the long-standing tradition of shura or consultative decision-making. Still the compatibility of such practices and
liberal democracy as practiced in the West remains in debate. See for example ‘‘Islam and Democracy,’’ United States
Institute of Peace, Special Report 83, online 2004 at USIP.org.
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Tameem, and Baghdad. Of course, other federal systems have struggled with sim-
ilar dilemmas, as in India’s ethnic minority patterns at the local, regional, and
national levels. Such federal unions amidst hostile and suspicious ethnic commu-
nities are always tenuous and require a delicate balance of diplomacy and enforce-
ment, in Iraq’s case further complicated by the concentration of oil and resources in
certain ‘‘ethnic’’ provinces with sub-groups feeling threatened or excluded from
power and wealth. Indeed, no province can be ethnically ‘‘pure,’’ and there could
be resistance among those whose insecurity is heightened by the control of the
dominant local ethnicity.
Ethno-sectarian antagonism would also impact the relationship governing the
provinces and the central government. Minorities in one province could seek the
support of their fellow group members in another province, or across a border.
Kurds in the Arab province of Tameem, for example, might lean on the support of
the Iraqi Kurdish provinces of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah regarding their status and
rights. Potentially, this can reach an explosive point, including moves toward ‘‘eth-
nic cleansing’’ and communal conflicts within and between the provinces.
The remedies of the transitional laws provide additional dangers for fueling this
potentially explosive situation. Article 58 states that ‘‘The Iraqi Transitional Gov-
ernment, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant
bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by
the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain
regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places
of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to
the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality.’’ Reacting
to the prior Ba’athist regime, the laws propose the formation of various commis-
sions to relocate and compensate ethnic populations as well as to redraw admin-
istrative boundaries. The resolution of these matters has already alarmed the
various Iraqi ethnic groups and brought them closer to the verge of civil war.24
The political identity of each province and the federation as a whole would also
represent a source of instability. Religious authorities seeking a greater role in any
future province would, for example, present a serious challenge to the formation of
a political and national identity. Although Sunni and Shi’a militia have pledged
common struggle against the excesses of the occupation authority, Ayatollah Sistani
and other Shi’a clerics have insisted that the federation must institutionalize Islamic
laws and traditions, thus affording the Shi’a religious authority a direct role in the
framing of provisional and federal identity. The Sunni Kurds in the North, on the
other hand, have been led by secular nationalist parties seeking a secularly oriented
federation. They fear that the Islamization of Kurdistan would undermine their
authority. Some Sunni Arabs, on the other hand, have demanded an active role for
their own religious authorities in defining the provinces and the federation, while
other Sunnis, perhaps reflecting Ba’athist traditions, remain in the secular camp.
Such a religious–sectarian–secular struggle was manifested in the early inability of
the Iraqi religious sects to determine the end of Ramadan in the year 2003 after
four different religious authorities approved four different monthly calendars.
Federalism in Iraq would crucially impact the bordering states as well. Kanan
Makiya, a leading Iraqi dissident intellectual and author of the Democratic Prin-
ciples Working Group report for the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project,
concluded that the ethnic-based federalization of Iraq would lead only to the
24Immediately following the signing of the interim agreement, violence broke out in Kirkuk between the Kurds
on the one side and Arabs and Turkomen on the other. See ‘‘Constitution celebrations turn violent in north Iraq’’
Agence France Presse, March 8, 2004. See the Turkomen opposition to the interim agreement and their threat to
declare Kirkuk as the capital of their Turkomenistan: Hussein Hindawi ‘‘Turkmen also reject Iraqi constitution.’’
United Press International, March 23, 2004. The Kurds are claiming Kirkuk to be the capital of their Kurdistan, see
William Safire, ‘‘Resolute in Iraq’’ The International Herald Tribune, April 8, 2004.
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country’s distress. He maintained that such a plan not only would establish eco-
nomic and social barriers between the federated states but also would further invite
regional meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs.25 It would boost ethnic and religious
identities and intensify separatist drives26 among the Kurds in the North and the
Shi’a in the South, who would discover new power and self-government they never
attained before. This would alarm every state bordering Iraq that maintains a
substantial Kurdish or Shi’a minority, or even other ethnic mixes. As a direct result
Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iran might be ‘‘forced’’ to take an
active involvement in Iraq so as to curb (or encourage) either Kurdish or Shi’a
aspirations and to use this leverage against the Iraqi state.
Depending upon how it is administered, therefore, Iraqi federalism could prove
to be an active ingredient in regional instability and ethno-religious fragmentation.
Ethnic and sectarian groups in the Middle East might be encouraged by the Iraqi
example to seek the intervention of outside powers in demanding autonomous
regions of their own. For a multi-ethnic multi-sectarian Middle East, this would
imply a widespread geopolitical upheaval leading toward greater fragmentation
and instability and potentially toward more governmental repression and police
states. As yet none of the federalist advocates have provided satisfactory answers
and implemental plans. As Kanan Makiya observed, ‘‘neither the Kurdish parlia-
ment nor the INC [Iraqi National Congress] have specified what they mean by
‘federalism,’ nor have they worked out its practical implications, especially with
regard to the mechanics of power sharing and resource distribution.’’27
The Way Forward
The political and ethnic fragility existing today in Iraq requires plans to further
unify and strengthen the country’s multi-ethnic, religious, and secular fabric. It
requires transitional mechanisms that can guarantee smooth system changes, pro-
vide a nurturing environment for indigenous and imported democratic forms, and
save the country from shocking and radical changes that may cost it and the entire
region years of social, economic, and political upheavals. As a first premise, given
Iraq’s deeply engrained anti-colonial sentiment, this transition should be accom-
plished as much as possible under the auspices of international and especially
Middle Eastern authorities, rather than individual major powers. Furthermore,
such authorities should ideally be largely Arabic in nature. Even the United Nations
is suspected of Western domination, and while regional organizations such as the
Arab League have credibility and integrity problems of their own, certain regional
states might be acceptable as mediators, peacekeepers, and brokers in the complex
inter-ethnic and inter-regional negotiations necessary to render a pending agree-
ment practicable. Among such relatively trusted states, given past involvements in
the region, might be Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and conceivably
Egypt or some of the North African states.
A survey conducted in early 2004 by the Oxford Research International group
found that Iraqis overwhelmingly (79% of 2,737 respondents) want their country to
remain united and centralized, and that oddly enough the country most frequently
cited as a potential governance model was the U.A.E. (although a larger percentage
25Kanan Makiya ‘‘Federalism in the New Iraq’’ The New Republic, No. 4603, April 7, 2003.
26That raises a further set of issuesFhow to assemble a multi-ethnic and reliable security force, both police and
army. In the April, 2004 Al-Sadar uprising against CPA in the South many local Shi’a police forces joined the rank of
the insurgents.
27Kanan Makiya ‘‘Federalism in the New Iraq.’’ Op. cit, 2003.
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of respondents indicated that Iraq ‘‘needs no model’’).28 The vast majority of Arab
respondents (90%) preferred the unity of Iraq while fewer Kurdish interviewees
(26%) shared such a sentiment. Only a small majority of the Kurds (58% of Kurdish
respondents) wanted either a system of regional states with a federal government
(as the transitional laws provide) or to have Iraq divided along independent states
(12%). Even allowing for the Kurdish sentiments, the survey reveals a substantial
public opposition to plans that lead to the country’s dismemberment or undermine
its unity and centralism.
Still the question to be asked is the following: in a country of both mixed and
segregated ethnic groups, with a history of inter-ethnic tensions and semi-advanced
and resource based economic sectors, whose ethnic communities stretch beyond its
borders, and that possesses a limited democratic tradition, what political system can
manage to maintain such national unity and hopefully harmony? More specifically,
what form of decision-making could lead to an effective framework of governance:
traditional forums and councils; more modern constitutional conventions; informal
brokering; U.N. or international trusteeship variants?
Beyond the procedural question come the issues of political substance. Do ter-
ritorial federalism, ethnic federalism, small district proportional representation,
large-district proportional representation, or mixed representative models com-
bining elements of various systems constitute the best contextual approach to de-
mocratization? Should ‘‘consociational’’ or power-sharing norms be part of the mix
(as in Lebanon or Belgium)? How can procedural safeguards most effectively as-
sure minority rights and assuage insecurity in the state?
It is our inclination to suggest that there is no final and ready formula; Iraq will
have to live through one of the most challenging historic experiences of modern
political system formation, namely state formation under duress. The international
community and the provisional government might be able to ease the transition
somewhat, or indeed make it more difficult and controversial to adopt decidedly
Western political practices. Perhaps federalism or the nurturing of sectarian bar-
gains is not, after all, a means to stabilize Iraq or the Middle East. Alternatives to
federalism that can help maintain the unity and national integrity of Iraq, while
taking into consideration the political aspirations of its many ethno-religious
groups, must be carefully considered. We can only suggest that the extreme of
either federalism or centralism in less developed societies, with deep ethnic and
religious divisions stretching beyond national borders, may prove to be an ingre-
dient for recurrent internal conflict and external intervention.
What is essential, however, is to arrive at resolution to political representation in
ethnically divided societies, such as Iraq, and thereby strengthen national repre-
sentative institutions against the background of potential federal pitfalls. This may
be found in revising the electoral process as to yield fair distribution of power
without endangering national unity. Parliamentary electoral reforms, for instance,
may be found to strengthen national harmony by providing effective multiethnic
representation, with potential set-aside of specific numbers of seats, as used espe-
cially during transitions in South Africa, Fiji, Jordan, Mali, India, and Sri Lanka.
Indeed, parliamentary electoral reform is emerging among the top priorities
needed to provide representative and legitimate national institutions capable of
retaining national integrity.
28Oxford Research International, ‘‘National Survey of Iraq: February, 2004’’ (Oxford: England, 2004). The
survey also showed that Iraqis preferred and trusted the fledgling indigenous security apparatus, police and armed
forces, over foreign troops to establish and maintain order. In the interest of furthering democratic participation
and removing the impetus for insurrection, this sentiment, counter-intuitive though it may be, along with the hostile
reaction to forceful U.S. counterinsurgency methods, would seem to argue for the earliest possible exit of American
coalition forces from the country, including from planned military bases.
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Such transitional electoral reforms and permanent proportional representation
in Iraq need to be undertaken apart from and less controversially than the intro-
duction of broad scale radical changes such as the institutionalization of a federal
system. Effective implementation would be smooth and not require radical admin-
istrative changes, or an immediate national census. Such reforms should anticipate
the emerging changes in Iraq, such as the likely formation of ethnic and sectarian
parties (the Oxford Research survey showed no extant political parties and indeed
no leaders able to garner even as much as 10% of the popular support; even the
transitional ‘‘sovereign’’ Iraqi government is questionable in terms of its perceived
public legitimacy).
Since the collapse of the Hussein’s regime, over 100 political groups have
emerged in a fragmented patchwork.29 Among them are at least five major ethnic/
sectarian parties (Table 2). In addition to Al-Saddar’s Mahdi Army, two other major
groups have drawn substantial support among the Shi’a: the Da’wa party and the
TABLE 2. Political Parties in Iraq
Major parties
Iraqi National Congress (ADDED December 2003)
Partiya Demokrata Kurdistane (Democratic Kurdistan Party)
Yekiti Nistimani Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (ADDED December 2003)
Islamic Dawa Party ARA-Shi’i Islamic party
Jaysh Al-Mahdi (Al-Mahdi Army)
Minor parties
Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party
Constitutional Monarchy Movement
Al-Hizb al-Shuyu’i al-’Iraqi (Iraqi Communist Party)
Iraqi Democratic Union
Party of the New Republic
Party of the New Rise
Worker Communist Party of Iraq
Iraqi Forum for Democracy-a non-profit political action group.
Minor Kurdish parties
Kurdistan Communist Party
Kurdistan Toilers Party (ADDED December 2003)
Parti Rizgari Kurdistan/Hizb al-Tahrir al-Kurdistani (Kurdistan Liberation Party)
Parti Sosialisti Dimukrati Kurdistan (Democratic Socialist Party of Kurdistan)
Partiya Demokrata Kurdistane (Democratic Kurdistan Party)
Yekiti Nistimani Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)
Yekitiya Netewai Deˆmokrati Kurdistan (Kurdistan National Democratic Union)
Kurdistan Islamic Union
Minor Turkmen parties
Tu¨rkmen Halk Partisi (Turkmenian People’s Party)
Irak Tu¨rkmen Cephesi (Iraq Turkmen Front) (ADDED December 2003)
Minor Assyrian parties
Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADDED December 2003)
Assyrian Patriotic Party (ADDED December 2003)
Progressive Nationalist Party
Assyrian Universal Alliance (ADDED December 2003)
Gaba Shawtapaya Atouraya (Assyrian Socialist Party) (ADDED December 2003)
Zowaa Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADDED December 2003)
Sources: http://www.electionworld.org/election/parties.htm#iraq, The Middle East International Network Center,
and Author.
29Leslie Campbell and Thomas O. Melia, ‘‘Iraq’s Emerging Political Party Scene: Difficult Questions.’’ Arab
Reform Bulletin, January 2004, Vol. 2(1).
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Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Two major Kurdish parties main-
tain strong bases in the Northern Iraqi provinces: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Various Sunni groups continue
to form in an effort to regroup the remains of the Ba’ath party.30 Surveys of Iraqis
indicate only little emerging recognition of these parties among, and also an over-
whelming preference for a ‘‘strong democratic leader.’’31
Thus electoral system reform must provide a trusted leadership along with a
nurturing environment for a multi-party tradition where women and ethnic mi-
norities are clearly recognized. Such a system must also moderate ethno-sectarian
interests and enhance national integration by fostering accommodation and na-
tional alliance formation. Larry Diamond proposes that election reform must help
maintain the plurality of Iraq and its territorial integrity through the establishment
of a deep-rooted democratic multi-ethnic party tradition.32 The question becomes
what national electoral and constitutional reform structure can simultaneously fos-
ter strong leadership, ethnic representation, accommodation, and multi-party tra-
ditions?
What Electoral Options?
The transitional administrative laws envision a National Assembly of 275 members
divided along 18 administrative governorates (Article 31). Election of the National
Assembly would take place by December 31, 2004. Toward that end, the head of
electoral mission in Iraq and the director of U.N. global programs of electoral
assistance, Ms. Carina Perelli, was finally able to broker an agreement on the elec-
toral modalities for Iraq. The agreement establishes a framework and an electoral
commission to oversee the upcoming election. Ms. Perelli and the U.N. electoral
commission established that the best electoral system for the National Assembly that
could be implemented under the current circumstances is List Proportional Rep-
resentation (LPR). ‘‘It was determined,’’ Perelli announced ‘‘that the best system for
these elections to the National Assembly of Iraq, and only for these elections, would
be the system of proportional representation, using the whole country as a single
national district.’’ Under LPR, parties would be able to run their national lists that
may consist up to 275 candidates, but shorter lists of 12 candidates could also be
established. Each candidate would have to gather 500 valid signatures to be placed
on the ballot and may require a 26,000–27,000 threshold vote to win a seat in the
National Assembly. Votes would be counted in a ranked order as the highest ranked
candidate wins. Independent candidates may establish individual lists.33
LPR has been championed for its potential to provide representation based on
regional and ethnic consosciotionalism, which ‘‘entails a power-sharing agreement
within government, brokered between clearly defined segments of society divided
by ethnicity, religion and language’’34 (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and
Switzerland). Because seats often are allocated within regionally based multi-mem-
ber districts (as in PR systems in Germany, Namibia, Netherlands, Denmark, South
Africa, and New Zealand), minority interests are thus protected through segmental
autonomy and provided with mutual vetoes.
It appears that the U.N. decision to implement LPR was also inspired by the
success of the system in the Iraqi Kurdistan region where in 1992 a Kurdish elec-
30Leslie Campbell and Thomas O. Melia, Op. cit, 2004.
31‘‘National Survey of Iraq: February, 2004,’’ Op. cit, 2004.
32Larry Diamond, ‘‘Democracy and Post-War Iraq’’ an essay adapted from remarks given at the Nixon Center,
May 16, 2003. The National Interest, May 23, 2003,Vol. 2 (20).
33See Department of Defense Briefing ‘‘Coalition Authority Briefing RE: Election Preparation in Iraq.’’ Briefer:
Carina Perelli, U.N. Electoral Assistance Division (Baghdad: Iraq, June 4, 2004).
34Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly, eds. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm, Sweden:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998).
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tion under LPR established a Parliament and led to the formation of a stable au-
tonomous coalition government. The Kurdish Parliament consisted of 105 seats
(five allocated to Assyrian/Christians minority) that were contested along three
major party-lists led by major Kurdish and Assyrian parties and included minor
parties and independent candidates: the Kurdistan Democratic Party List (KDP),
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Christians/Assyrians lists. The
parliamentary election resulted in a draw between the KDP and the PUK and seats
were divided between them leaving the Christians/Assyrians five seats. All minor
parties failed to win the necessary threshold vote of 7%. An inclusive coalition
government was then established led by the two Kurdish parties with few minis-
terial seats allocated to independents and minor parties.35
However, and contrary to the success achieved in Kurdistan, implementing LPR
in the election for the National Assembly in Iraq, taking the country as a whole as a
single electoral national district (as implemented in Israel and Namibia), may not
achieve the intended coalitional remedies to Iraq’s ethnic representation dilemma.
The national diversity of polarized cleavages and parties combined with the existing
security breaches in today’s Iraq do not mirror the peculiarity of 1992 Kurdistan.
Applying LPR in Iraq while the country is undergoing transition entails serious
shortcomings and potential dangers. These deficiencies in the implementation of
the LPR in a divided society must be carefully and adequately examined.
One of the shortfalls of LPR in Iraq, as proposed by the U.N., is the long party
candidate lists that add to voters’ confusion and frustrations. A full party list can
include 275 candidates. Each candidate has to win approximately 26,000–27,000
votes in order to win a seat in the National Assembly. Party candidates have better
chances than independents to gather votes due to both the simpler and closed list
voting as well as the ranked votes required to win. As a consequence, the LPR
would ideally establish strong party tradition and undermine local interest as the
candidates’ connection with the constituency weakens36 (in Kurdistan, party tra-
dition was further strengthened by establishing a high quota for party listsF7%).
In order to avoid the strong Kurdish partisanship experience, the U.N. has
leaned to removing the high quota threshold to win a seat, allowing independent
candidates and smaller parties, particularly ethnic parties and candidates, better
chances to form lists (suggesting 27,000 votes or less than 2% of legal voters). This
U.N. remedy, however, might prove explosive in Iraqi society. Small parties, local
groups, and individual candidates might be able to mobilize votes and win seats by
resorting to extreme local agendas or single interest issues that cannot be adopted
by major mainstream parties (see the Israeli example), thus boosting the potential
of factional, extremist, sectarian, and ethnic politics in many regions of Iraq.
This U.N. electoral formula further creates internal party competition and frag-
mentation. While this may have not been proven to be a major problem in two- or
three-party systems, such as in Ireland, which implements a similar version of the
PR known as Single Transferable Vote or in Kurdistan where only two dominant
parties exist, its consequences cannot be predicted in ethnically based multi-party
democracy where a large number of seats are being contested (275) among many
parties (see Table 2). Considering the large number of contested seats, party dis-
cipline is difficult to attain. Candidates within parties may advocate extreme po-
sitions in order to win and maintain ethnic or sectarian segments against other
opponent party moderates (particularly to win votes from ethnically/sectarian
closed regions), and thus parties might fragment into many opposing small factions
35Fran Hazelton, ‘‘Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy.’’ London: Zed, 1994.
36See Reynolds, Andrew, Reilly, Ben ‘‘List PR–Disadvantages.’’ Administration and Cost of Elections Project
(ACE), a division of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, Sweden, 2003:
http://www.aceproject.org
IMAD SALAMEYAND FREDERIC PEARSON 203
(a phenomenon seen at times for different reasons in Israel), thus undermining the
system’s national centripetal momentum.
Therefore, among the most troubling defects of the LPR system in Iraq is the
ability of small extreme sectarian or ethnic groups to mobilize and win substantial
representation, through parties, factions, or individual candidates. This is partic-
ularly alarming when considering the large number of ethnic, religious, sectarian,
secular, and tribal cleavages existing in the country. While LPR may resolve the
dilemma of small ethnic minorities and female representation in Iraq, it has the
potential to spawn ethnic and sectarian fragmentation, undermine local interests,
and provide extremists access to power.
During this critical transitional period, Iraq is in immense need of a political
system that provides fair national and minority political representation, including
interests represented by the various insurgencies. Yet, representation also must
allow accommodative and moderate political momentum so as to strengthen the
unity of the country. A proper representative institutional environment that un-
dermines fragmentation and encourages stability is thus very crucial. Unfortunate-
ly, LPR could fail to achieve such goals. The system appears primed to fragment
and polarize the voters rather than unite them. Considering the many existing
ethnic, sectarian, regional, and tribal cleavages and the large number of contested
seats in the National Assembly, and basic distrust of an electoral process in the midst
of occupation and insurgency, with many parts of the country potentially left out of
the vote even temporarily, LPR seems likely to yield a system of numerous polar-
ized small and medium-sized parties.
At the same time, since transitional Prime Minister Iyad Alawi is perhaps emerg-
ing as the most recognized, for better or worse, new Iraqi ‘‘mainstream’’ politician,
he is likely to score highly in electoral influence. His original base of support came
from Iraqi military, intelligence, and political defectors, and he has utilized the
support of the American coalition to foster relations with various ethnic commu-
nities. Even so, the establishment of a post-election coalition government could turn
to be a nightmare process. With many interests pulling in different directions,
severe opposition and division will confront small or medium-sized coalitions.
Grand National alliance, the more likely scenario for a country undergoing tran-
sition, would not accomplish a better result. With the absence of a large stabilizing
national dominant party–contrary to the Kurdistan situation and Israel–such an
alliance would have to endure persistent conditions of instability and defection
instigated by economic, political, and ethnic insecurity and polarization. It might
frequently fall back on military ties for its ultimate support.
LPR, although notably successful in some countries that underwent transitions
similar to Iraq (e.g. Namibia), may confront still other difficulties in the Iraqi polity.
The absence of a large dominant party, the lack of a strong national Iraqi party
tradition (with the exception of the Baath Party), the large number of contested
seats for its National Assembly, the formation of the country as a single national
electoral district, the existence of deep ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the im-
mense security requirement confronting the country have the potential to render
the LPR a major failure in Iraq.37
A survey of electoral systems implemented around the world reveals that at least
two other system types in addition to LPR would have been suited for a divided
society such as Iraq: (a) the Alternative Vote (AV) system and (b) Mixed system
37Yet, we should note that the ability of a strong national leader at the head of the executive branch may help
undermine coalition instability as has been the case in Israel under the various strong national leaders (Sharon,
Begin, Ben Gurion, etc.). However, most executive national leaders who emerged in countries like Iraq and were
able to unify the country (e.g., Attaturk, Nassir, Mandela, etc. . .) came amid their assertion of national identity
against ‘‘foreign’’ dominance. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Iraqi executive branch will be able to win large
popular support and would most likely remain subject to U.S. protection (e.g., Afghanistan), a situation that would
not help the emergence of a strong national leader to curb coalition defection and opposition.
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where strategies that explicitly recognize the presence of communal groups are
implemented.38
Technically, the AV system is very similar to LPR in providing the voter with
choice between the party list and individual choice for candidates. Yet, the major
difference is that the AV generally is implemented in Parliamentary elections based
on single-member districts. Thus, it is considered ‘majoritarian’ rather than ‘pro-
portional,’ whereby a single candidate requires a majority of the votes in each
district. Very crucial to the AV is having the voter rank candidates by an order of
preference (e.g., Papua New Guinea 1964–1975, Fiji 1997, Australia). If no can-
didate obtains a majority at the first count, the last-place candidate is eliminated and
second-choice votes are added to the totals. This process is repeated until a single
candidate secures the district’s majority. By running the election contests in small
district levels, the AV system resolves the problem of competition and the potential
of inter-party fragmentation that the LPR may produce. Parties need to nominate
only one candidate for each electoral district and candidates are held accountable to
their local constituency. Such a factor, plus the local district arrangement, strength-
ens the all-important voter–candidate identification in an evolving democratic en-
vironment such as Iraq’s.
The implementation of AV in Papua New Guinea (1964–1975) is credited with
helping undermine clan divisions and achieving unity and accommodation in
mixed districts while preserving parties’ unity.39 The AV option maintains most
LPR advantages, yet its vote, based on ranked preferences, introduces additional
complexity for voters. Another disadvantage of the AVover the LPR is the inability
of AV to cluster the vote of small and geographically dispersed regions. Otherwise,
and considering Iraq’s pre-existing and numerous small single-member districts
division, AV would appear to be more historically appropriate to the country.
The transitional administrative laws establish the need for electoral law ‘‘to
achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the mem-
bers of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities
in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.’’ Thus, the tran-
sitional laws introduce a minority provision (MP) system while leaving the means to
be specified by an electoral law.
Strategies that explicitly recognize the presence of communal groups have been
implemented in different ethnically divided countries with various degrees of suc-
cess (e.g., Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Colombia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Taiwan, Western Samoa, Niger, the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon). In Leb-
anon, and despite its various failures, the allocation of confessional seats to various
religious sects has been viewed as responsible for maintaining the fragile unity of
the country for over a half century. Such approaches could also have been imple-
mented in Iraq, as in partial implementation in the Kurdistan Parliament since
1992.
Achieving both proportionality and, at the same time, incentives for inter-ethnic
and sectarian accommodation and power sharing would constitute the greatest
challenge for the drafting and the implementation of any future Iraqi electoral law.
Considering Iraq’s existing administrative division (18), pre-existing parliamentary
small single-member electoral districts, and mutli-ethnic and sectarian constituen-
cies, its lack of strong partisan national democratic tradition, the most appealing
electoral system would have been one that institutionalizes the advantages of the AV
system with ethnic and minority set-aside provisions (MP).40
38Harris, Peter and Ben Reilly, eds. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Op. cit, 1998.
39Reilly, Ben ‘‘Papua New Guinea: Electoral Incentives for Inter-Ethnic Accommodation.’’ In Democracy and
Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, edited by Peter Harris and Ben Reilly. Op. cit, 1998.
40This would provide Iraq a mixed electoral system where the advantages of both AVand MP are implemented.
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Aspects of AV could have helped achieve an accommodative politics through
enhancing the electoral chances of moderate representatives. By implementing AV
in most of Iraq’s ethnically mixed districts, the majority threshold would have led to
strong incentives for parties and candidates to gain the support of other local
groups (in most districts within the Central and Northern provinces). The centrality
of local single-member majoritarian-based elections would have driven the parties
to establish Grand National alliances and to propose moderate national platforms in
order to allow local districts candidates on the party or bloc lists the ability to reach
out to the largest possible constituency. This could have enhanced the electoral
chances of parties with inter/multi-ethnic appeals and undermined otherwise ex-
treme sectarian and separatist groups.
In most southern solid Shi’a districts (e.g., in Muthanna, Qadissiya, Najaf, Thi-
Qar, Karbala, and Missana governorates) and the northern Kurdish districts (in
Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk governorates), the AV system may not appear to
achieve such an immediate outcome. However, because parties would most likely
need to form a post-election coalition government, and since there are various
major competing political parties, parties would have to appeal to common national
interests to win access to ruling alliances. This fact would have further undermined
the incentives for parties to play to religious and ethnic extremism. As a result,
smaller localized extremist parties would have been less rewarded and unable to
maintain constituent support.
The advantages of the AV in regard to Iraq can be recognized in its flexibility,
integrating strategies of various electoral systems. For example, aspects of Minority
Provisions can be included within the AV framework as the transitional laws re-
quire. Parties or Bloc candidate lists for the districts could be required to include
25% or more women candidates, thus making female political inclusion not only a
parliamentary but a party tradition as well. The same could be applied to smaller
ethnic and sectarian minorities whose geographic dispersion in particular gov-
ernorates make their representation difficult to be achieved (e.g., Turkomans and
Assyrians in the north). The implementation of AV is also suitable for the tran-
sitional period in Iraq since it does not require major or radical electoral trans-
formation, where national census or referendum may otherwise be required. It
maintains the single-majority member district while being applied within the pre-
existing administrative governorate division.
What remains to be resolved, however, is the AV complexity to voters and to
Iraq’s large semi-literate population. Intensive voter education projects would have
been required, perhaps on the remarkable example of ANC action in the early days
of South African transition. Alternatives to voter ranking requirements (where the
voter must number candidate preferences) also would have to be explored. One
solution might be to have the voters vote two or three pre-ranked voting cards
(distinguished by color) instead of ranking the candidate on one card.
In post-election Iraq more aggressive parliamentary electoral reform may be
implemented and explored. An elected Iraqi National Assembly will have wider
authority to enact far-reaching electoral laws and establish more balanced and
ethnically sensitive electoral districts. Implementing aspects of the AV along with
MP should continue to be seriously considered as electoral strategies for the future.
Conclusion
Whether or not federalism in its Arab–Kurdish or loose sectarian forms is finally
implemented in Iraq, strengthening Iraqi national institutions and particularly the
National Assembly and the judiciary would prove to be the only safeguard that
guarantees national integrity from division and fragmentation. The ability of the
National Assembly to represent the diverse Iraqi political, ethno-sectarian, and
gender cleavages, i.e., to achieve political stability, will determine to a large extent
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Iraq’s national unity and democratic future. Much depends as well on the pres-
idential balloting to produce a leader trusted as both ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘democratic,’’
and to assure that this applies to the prime minister’s post as well. Devising means
toward establishing an accommodative and representative National Assembly, to-
gether with party integrity and workable coalition governments, would be the
condition for achieving such an end.
LPR entails serious shortcomings that may weaken rather than strengthen sta-
bility and national harmony. In this paper, we have proposed that the Alternative
Vote system with Minority Provision offers an alternative for Iraq whose feasibility
must continue to be explored in future electoral reforms. In addition, the preferred
combination of ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘democratic’’ leadership presents hazards as seen
during Russia’s reaction to challenges of ethno-terrorism and separatist struggles.
The role of the courts and the civil loyalty and discipline of the armed forces and
police are keys to maintaining democratic pluralism in the midst of insecurity and
the temptations of executive power.
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